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sample selection model with the protest votes should be preferred to the model without protest votes, since it takes into account the uncertainty about the estimates of the willingness to pay for the public good.
Non technical abstract
Contingent valuation surveys are increasingly used to assess the value of public goods, and help public decision making. Sampled individuals' reservation prices for the public good, and other relevant variables, are modeled to estimate its value. Unfortunately, it can be often observed that respondents may seemingly place a null value on the public good, for reasons that differ from a genuine indifference to the good, but that can be interpreted as a "protest": either against the interview, or the public management, or both.
A good survey design can effectively reduce them, but protest votes can hardly be completely removed from the dataset. The question is how to deal with them.
Sometimes they are considered as true zero values, or, if a dichotomous choice method is used to elicit the reservation price, as if they were below the minimum bid offered to the individual.
Obviously, if the unwillingness to pay reflects only protest and not a low or null valuation of the good, this procedure results in downward biased estimates of the willingness to pay measure.
Alternatively, observations with protest votes are simply removed from the dataset, and only the sub-sample with positive reservation prices is considered in the analysis. This procedure will not affect the validity of the estimates only if there is no sample selection bias. Otherwise, the estimates of the willingness to pay will be upward or downward biased, depending on the sign of the sample selection bias.
In this paper we propose a survey design, and a sample selection model that allows taking into account, and correcting, the possible bias due to protest votes. The model is designed for dichotomous choice contingent valuation data, but it can be easily extended to continuous type of data. An application is presented for illustrative purpose, implemented with a Gauss 386-i routine. It is shown that selection bias can sensibly affect the estimates of the willingness to pay for the public good.
Some authors warn not to base the judgement on the presence of selection bias exclusively on the asymptotic standard errors estimated by means of the inverse of the information matrix, and suggest to use instead alternative procedures based on the likelihood profile. We show an application of this methodology. It will be seen that sample selection models may present estimation problems because of the flatness of the likelihood function: in some cases confidence
Introduction
Contingent valuation surveys are increasingly used to assess the value of public goods, and help public decision making. The reservation price of sampled individuals for the provision of a public good is elicited, and modeled with other relevant variables to produce an estimate for the value of the public good.
One problem often encountered in contingent valuation analyses is the high percentage of zero values in the sample. A zero value is not a problem if the respondent is sincerely indifferent to the good, since in that case the stated value reflects the true value. However, it can often be observed that respondents place a zero value in the elicitation question for reasons that differ from a genuine indifference to the good (Donaldson et al. (1998); Mitchell and Carson (1989, pp.166-7) . For example, some people may refuse the idea of placing monetary values to public goods like the environment or a historical monument. If, as it often is the case, the valuation is elicited in term of willingness to pay a tax for contributing to the provision of the public good, some may protest against the inefficiency of the public administration in managing public funds, and refuse to pay the proposed tax. Others may behave strategically, if they think that their answer could influence the actual level of taxation.
To some extent, distortions can be controlled by a good survey design: strategic behavior can be prevented by making clear that the respondent's action is very important for informative purposes, but is not going to have any influence on the level of fiscal pressure. Protest votes caused by mistrust about the efficiency of the public administration could be removed by using a payment vehicle other than taxes. Sometimes respondents are asked to hypothesize that special funds are raised to provide the public good, administered by trusts over which citizens may exercise their control. However, this alternative may cause other problems. If payment to the trust is taken on a voluntary basis, strategic behavior can again affect the answers, especially in social contexts where voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods are not much common. A compulsory payment to a trust, on the other hand, would presumably cause some other bias, due to the unrealistic setting. A requirement for reliability of contingent valuation estimates is that the scenario should be plausible enough to produce sensible answers.
Thus, protest votes can hardly be completely removed from the survey dataset. The question is how to deal with them. Sometimes they are considered as true zero values, or, if the dichotomous choice method is used, as if they were below the minimum bid. Obviously, if the unwillingness to pay reflects only a protest and not a low or null valuation of the good, this procedure results in downward biased estimates of the willingness to pay (henceforth wtp) measure.
Alternatively, and more frequently, observations with protest votes are simply removed from the dataset, and only the subsample with positive reservation prices is considered in the analysis (Whitehead et al. (1993) ; Mitchell and Carson (1989) ). As we will see in the next sections, this procedure will not have any effect for the validity of the estimates only if the probability of obtaining a protest response from individuals with specific socioeconomic characteristics is independent of the value they give to the good.
Some models have been proposed to take into account the sequential nature of the responses in the elicitation process (cfr. Lee (1992) , and Howe et al.(1994) ); other studies deal specifically with the problem of testing for sample selection bias (cfr. Whitehead et al. (1993) ). However, we are not aware of any specification proposed in the literature to correct selectivity bias in contingent valuation analysis. In this paper we propose a sample selection model that allows taking into account, and correcting, the possible bias due to protest votes. Assuming for simplicity normally distributed disturbances, if the dependent variable is continuous the correct specification would be a sample selection Tobit model; while if it is discrete, a sample selection Probit model should be used. The model presented here is designed for dichotomous choice contingent valuation data, but it can be easily extended to continuous type of data.
Some authors (cfr. Copas, 1990) warn not to base the judgement on the presence of selection bias exclusively on the asymptotic standard errors estimated by means of the inverse of the information matrix, and suggest to use instead alternative procedures based on the likelihood profile. We show an application of this methodology. It will be seen that sample selection models may present estimation problems because of the flatness of the likelihood function: in some cases confidence intervals around the sample selection coefficient are too wide to give evidence of presence or absence of sample selection bias. We maintain that even in these circumstances the sample selection model with the protest votes should be preferred to the model without protest votes, since it takes into account the uncertainty about the estimates of the willingness to pay for the public good.
The model
Protest responses can be controlled for by constructing a system of sequential questions about the individual's willingness to pay for the good. An initial question is posed to know if the individual would be in favor or against the provision of the public good. This question selects between people that, ceteris paribus, can be at least as well off with the public good as before it was provided, and people that are worse off with the public good. A typical example may be that of residents in the neighborhoods of a planned new airport. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider here only situations where the public good is considered indeed as a good by the population, i.e. the provision of the public good makes everyone at least as well off.
The structure of the following questions depends on the elicitation method used. For example, when the elicitation method produces a specific value, as in the open ended or the bidding game formats, the elicitation question can be posed at this stage; those that put a zero value can then be further inquired about the motives behind their answer.
Alternatively, and especially when the dichotomous choice format is applied, the elicitation question is preceded by a question asking the individual if he or she would be favorable to the imposition of a tax (or the request to pay a ticket, depending on the payment vehicle that was chosen) to contribute to the provision of the good. If the individual says yes, a follow up question is posed to elicit the individual's wtp. If the individual says no, a follow up question asks for the motives behind the answer. This structure allows selection of observations with positive wtp, and gathering of enough information to understand the nature of each case of unwillingness to pay for the good: whether it should be treated as a genuine indifference to the public good, or rather as an expression of protest, either against the public administration, or against the interview. When the respondent displays indifference toward the public good, we can reasonably assume that the reservation price is zero, or between zero and the minimum bid proposed.
Together with the responses of the individuals that are favorable to the payment of a tax (ticket) for the public good, these observations give direct information about the individual willingness to pay. If the respondent instead displays interest toward the public good, but nevertheless refuses the idea of contributing to the payment because, say, of protest toward the management of the public budget, no information about the reservation price can be gathered.
Data produced by this design can be expressed through a dichotomous variable, assuming value 1 if information about the individual's willingness to pay is available, and zero otherwise. When this dummy variable is equal to 1, another dichotomous variable indicates willingness to pay a given amount: the bid that was actually offered to the individual, or the lowest bid for those who showed indifference toward the public good.
These responses can be modeled simultaneously with two equations: the first one is the selection equation, and the second one is the elicitation equation. The model proposed applies to the dichotomous choice elicitation method, but a similar procedure can be adopted when the elicitation format provides continuous wtp data, using a tobit instead of the probit in the elicitation equation. 
and the likelihood function can be written as follows:
which implicitly contains the joint probabilities of Y is estimable due to the variability of the bids among individuals. The log-likelihood can be written in the following way: can be obtained simultaneously, by maximizing the loglikelihood with respect to all arguments. However, Copas (1990) notes that the likelihood functions of models like (1)- (2) 
where V is the variance-covariance matrix of 2 β . This is different from calculating the mean willingness to pay from observed responses of Y 2 because:
where the term ) (
is the bias due to selection of individuals, the sign depending on the sign of ρ: if 0 < ρ we under-estimate the mean wtp while if 0 > ρ we over-estimate the mean wtp.
The Data
We present now an application of the sample selection model introduced in the previous section. We use data from a preliminary stage of a contingent valuation analysis for an urban park in the metropolitan area of Cagliari, Italy.
Since the scope here is only illustrative of the sample selection model, the description of the survey will be limited to the essential. We used a dichotomous choice model for elicitation of the reservation price. Before the elicitation question was posed, the individual was asked if he or she would have been favorable towards the imposition of a tax, on the top of the income tax he or she already paid, to help provide the public good. For individuals answering yes, a follow up question was posed to elicit the willingness to pay; for individuals answering no, a follow up question was posed to select people indifferent to the public good from people that were giving protest responses.
Unfortunately, one of the interviewers did not take enough care in collecting the latter information, and this resulted in many missing or invalid data points: therefore, we could not properly select between individuals that were genuinely indifferent to the public good and those that were giving a protest response. Since these data do not allow selection between individuals that (directly or indirectly) provided a valuation for the public good, and people that, because of protest, did not evaluate the good, the selection variable in the following application is just the answer to the question about the attitude toward the payment of a tax.
The questionnaire contained questions aimed at gathering information about the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent. Information leaflets were attached to give a description of the project. It was especially emphasized that the park could supply leisure services: sport facilities, playgrounds for children, observation points for birdwatching, and similar services to be consumed in the leisure time.
Our final sample consisted of 184 observations: 102 individuals answered that they would be favorable to the payment of a tax, and were then asked about their willingness to pay a given amount. The bid vector used was constructed on the basis of a preliminary set of open ended interviews to a small sample: the bids used were: 10, 25, 50, 100, 175, 200, 350 (values expressed in thousand Lit).
Results
The model reported in Table 1 has been selected against other possible specifications on the basis of Likelihood Ratio tests for nested models, and the Akaike Criterion for non nested models (cfr. Greene (1993) ). The regressors are: age, which is a continuous variable ranging from 19 yr. to 80 yr., with a mean of about 50 yr.; leisure, which is a dichotomous variable, with value 1 if the individual's expenditure for leisure activities accounts for more than 20% of his or her personal income, otherwise the value is zero. The percentage of individuals in the sample with higher leisure time expenditure was about 26%. Finally, the dummy variable Not working distinguishes students, retired, housewives and unemployed individuals from those that are currently working: the percentage of "Not working" people in the sample was about 36%.
The model presented has two regressors (age and leisure) in the selection equation, and only one regressor (Not working) in the elicitation equation.
In order to enhance the reliability of the estimates, we followed the procedure suggested by Copas (1990) discussed in section 2: we first obtained a likelihood profile for a grid of parameter values of ρ in the range [-1,1], and then obtained its maximum likelihood estimate by optimizing the profile.
Results for the parameter estimates are presented in Table 1 . 
From the coefficients of the sample selection equation we can infer that the probability of consenting to the introduction of a tax for the public good is higher for younger people and for people that spend a higher percentage of their income in leisure activities. When we look instead at the elicitation equation, we see that the actual level of willingness to pay for the good depends on the professional condition of the individual. As it can be easily guessed, people that are not currently working are willing to pay a lower price for the public good. The professional condition can be considered as a proxy for personal income: just like the variable leisure, which when taken alone in the elicitation equation is also significant, with a positive sign.
The dependent variables in the sample selection equation and in the elicitation equation are negatively correlated (conditional on the independent variables), as implied by the sign of the coefficient ρ, and the magnitude of correlation (almost 0.7) is not negligible. This result seems counter-intuitive, since it would imply that people that are more favorable to the introduction of a tax to help the provision of the good are also willing to pay less. When the follow up question about the motivation of their opposition to a tax for the park was effectively posed, many answered that taxation is high enough already, and that the public administration should be more efficient in the budget management. A possible interpretation for the negative sign of the correlation coefficient is that people that protest more for the imposition of taxes are people that already pay high income taxes because of higher incomes. On the other hand, if people in the higher income class decide to accept the payment, they will probably have higher reservation prices than individuals with lower incomes. The effect of income in the two decisions is not entirely taken into account by the independent variable, since they are just approximations. If this interpretation is correct, the sample selection model would effectively account for protest votes.
As it can be seen from Table 2 , the 90% confidence interval about ρ (represented by digits in bold italics) include the ρ values in the range [-0.9, -0.1]. It can be observed that the log-likelihood in this range is very flat, producing a wide confidence interval that covers almost all negative values.
We can anyway confidently exclude the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias (ρ = 0). It can also be observed that the log-likelihood function does not behave well in the boundaries of the interval for ρ: in particular, notice the high jump of the log-likelihood function when ρ = 1. The estimates for mean wtp (and relative confidence interval) are reported in Table 3 
Conclusions
We saw that estimates from the sample selection model are quite different from those produced by the censored sample model, where the sample selection bias is not accounted for. We presented an application where the confidence interval about the correlation coefficient allows us to exclude the hypothesis of null correlation between the responses of the selection equation and the elicitation equation. In other terms, since the hypothesis of sample selection bias is accepted, use of the censored sample model would lead us to incorrect estimates for the valuation of the public good.
Unfortunately, as shown by Copas (1990) , sample selection models are often characterized by very flat likelihood functions, which may cause estimation problems if algorithms do not converge; and even if they do converge, the standard results of the asymptotic theory cannot be applied to the model. In these situations nothing conclusive can be said about the presence (or not) of sample selection bias. A possible solution could be given by increasing the number of observations: however this is often not feasible, and indeed the same sample selection model is needed to correct for an imperfect design in a completed survey. Alternatively, when the confidence interval around the selection parameter is so wide that nothing conclusive can be said about the presence or not of sample selection bias, the analyst may use a priori information to restrict the hypotheses about the value of the correlation coefficient. In any case, when nothing conclusive can be said about the correlation coefficient, it is advisable to accept the sample selection model rather than the censored sample model: this allows us to take into account the uncertainty about the wtp estimate. Calculating the central measure for the wtp for different possible values of the sample selection coefficient may give quite different values: the confidence interval will be very wide, and allows for more conservative estimates than those obtained with the more precise, but possibly biased, censored sample model.
